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Abstract: This article contributes to an emerging conversation about the support among the Sunni 
ʿulamāʾ for the 3 July 2013 coup in Egypt and the massacres that followed. I focus on the legal 
justifications for the coup and its bloody aftermath articulated by the former Grand Mufti ʿAli 
Jumʿa (b.1952) and, in particular, engage with the interpretation presented by Muhammad Fadel 
in an article published in 2016. In contrast to Fadel’s argument, which views Jumʿa’s support for 
the coup as indebted to well-established, premodern lines of reasoning, I consider Jumʿa’s 
arguments to be rooted in Egyptian nationalism and a discourse of the nation-state. Fadel 
attributes the divide between Jumʿa and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) over the coup to a division 
between two sub-traditions of Islamic political thought that he terms traditionalist and republican 
respectively. By contrast, I consider both Jumʿa and al-Qaradawi’s arguments to be 
representative of two sides of a nationalist coin that has its historical origins in the proto-
nationalism of Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi (d.1873).   
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Over the course of July and August 2013 Egyptian security forces killed an estimated 1150 
people at five locations. These locations included camps where protesters had gathered to oppose 
the ousting of President Muhammad Mursi (b.1951) in the 3 July 2013 military coup led by ʿAbd 
al-Fattah al-Sisi (b.1954). Human Rights Watch presented evidence that these massacres were 
the result of coordinated efforts by snipers, bulldozers, and armored personnel carriers, rather 
than an unavoidable consequence of preserving public order.1 The most well-known of these 
massacres occurred at the square by the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque on 14 August 2013. 
Among the most prominent supporters of the coup and its bloody aftermath was ʿAli 
Jumʿa (b.1952). Jumʿa was the Grand Mufti of Egypt from 2003 until February 2013, and he has 
remained a prominent public figure since then.2 In the aftermath of the coup Jumʿa was a 
common sight on Egyptian television, and his arguments supporting it were littered with 
concepts drawn from the Islamic jurisprudential (fiqh) tradition. He suggested that the coup was 
legitimate according to the principle of taghallub, a historically premodern concept whereby 
usurpers may legitimately take power by force. The assumption underpinning taghallub was that 
usurpers’ ability to overthrow a ruler demonstrated their de facto ability to ensure stable rule and 
avoid a protracted civil war. As such, it was a ruler’s ability to ensure stability that was the 
source of their legitimacy, rather than the means by which they had assumed power. After the 
coup Jumʿa also gave speeches and recorded lectures for the army. In these lectures Jumʿa often 
called the anti-coup protesters khawārij and the “dogs of hell” (kilāb al-nār).3 These terms, 
originating in Prophetic hadith and the history of early Islam, appeared to suggest that Jumʿa was 
legitimizing the army’s killing of the protestors on the grounds that they had engaged in 
illegitimate rebellion, and were no longer to be considered Muslim.4   
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Introduction  
The aim of this article is to contribute to an emerging conversation about Jumʿa and many of the 
Azharite ʿulamāʾ’s support for the 3 July 2013 coup.5 In general, current research has 
contextualized Jumʿa’s support for the coup in relation to quietist precedents in premodern 
Islamic political thought or his Sufi background.6 For example, Mohammad Fadel suggests that 
the divide between the ʿulamāʾ over the coup, epitomized by the opposing positions adopted by 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926) and Jumʿa, has its roots in the division between two sub-traditions, 
which he terms “republican” and “traditionalist” Islam. For Fadel, republican Islam has its roots 
in the nineteenth century reformers like Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi (d.1873), Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi 
(d.1890), and Rashid Rida (d.1935). These scholars, though not liberal, advocated for a more 
active citizenry and a public sphere that was more tolerant of alternative ideas.7 Fadel considers 
this sub-tradition to be best represented by al-Qaradawi and other ʿulamāʾ who opposed the coup 
and are generally sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. Contrastingly, Fadel suggests that the 
traditionalist Islam represented by Jumʿa and his supporters is linked to contemporary Sufism. In 
Fadel’s view, Sufism’s hierarchical relationship between teacher and student, integral to the 
cultivation of a pious Muslim subject, renders Sufism more sympathetic to authoritarianism.8 
This hierarchical structure was also expressed historically by premodern ʿulamāʾ such as al-
Ghazali (d.1111). Fadel does not argue that Jumʿa and the ʿulamāʾ of traditionalist Islam support 
authoritarian regimes “as a direct result of their adherence to the political philosophy articulated 
by medieval theologians” like al-Ghazali. Nevertheless, Fadel does contend that the ʿulamāʾ who 
supported the coup did so because they “share a certain political aesthetic” with the premodern 
ʿulamāʾ.9 In using the term “political aesthetic” Fadel is referring to al-Ghazali and his ʿulamāʾ 
peers’ idealized political order. This vision assumed that social harmony was best maintained 
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when the scholarly authority of the ʿulamāʾ establishment was united with the coercive force of 
the military elites in a shared purpose of preserving the public order. Though al-Ghazali 
considered this hierarchical “cosmic-moral order”10 to be underpinned by God, it nevertheless 
needed to be overseen by a pious autocrat. As a result, the ʿulamāʾ came to accept the legitimacy 
of a ruler who had taken power by force. Rather than contest the legitimacy of particular rulers 
on the basis of how they might have acquired their power, usually by force, the ʿulamāʾ of the 
late medieval period instead invested their energies in attempting to manage how the new ruler 
exercised that power.11 Fadel argues that following the marked pluralization of the Egyptian 
public sphere after the 2011 Revolution, where all manner of ideas about Islam were voiced and 
heard, the tensions between the traditionalist and republican sub-traditions came to a head, 
 
While advocates of republican Islam such as [al-Qaradawi] do not seem to be 
overly fearful of the spread of heterodoxy in the wake of democratization, 
traditionalist theologians such as [Jumʿa] have clearly decided that protection of 
religious orthodoxy is more important than establishing a representative 
government. In making this choice, they are clearly vindicating a well-established 
line of reasoning in Islamic political thought. The Muslim religious establishment 
of Egypt believes that in Sisi it has found the pious autocrat idealized by pre-
modern theologians such as al-Ghazali, and from their perspective, a religious 
autocrat who can control religious debate is preferable to a religious president [i.e. 
Mursi] presiding over a political system in which religious teachings become a 
subject of public contestation.12 
 
4 
 
For Fadel, then, the Azharite ʿulamāʾ of traditionalist Islam were unable to tolerate the radically 
democratized nature of the post-2011 public sphere, which had seen their authority as the voices 
of Islam markedly eroded. Fadel argues that, following the coup, Jumʿa and his like-minded 
colleagues saw an opportunity to reassert al-Azhar’s authority, and limit the proliferation of 
alternative actors that were competing with them as voices of Islam in the public sphere.13   
In this article I present an alternative interpretation of Jumʿa’s support for the coup. In 
contrast to Fadel’s presentation of a clash between two sub-traditions of political thought 
orignating in the premodern period and the nineteenth century respectively, I contend that 
Jumʿa’s arguments are rooted in Egyptian nationalism and a discourse of the nation-state. I argue 
that the concept of nationhood is highly significant for understanding Jumʿa’s Islamic legal 
arguments in favor of the coup and the subsequent crushing of anti-coup demonstrations. I 
therefore disagree with Fadel’s suggestion that it is only the republican Islam of al-Qaradawi that 
is rooted in the writings of nineteenth century authors like al-Tahtawi, while the authoritarian 
sympathies of Jumʿa and traditionalist Islam is rooted in Sufism and premodern Islamic thought. 
Instead, I consider Jumʿa’s pro-coup arguments to be rooted just as much in the legacy of the 
nineteenth century reformers as the anti-coup arguments of al-Qaradawi. Moreover, I consider 
the political vision articulated by the nineteenth century reformers to be deeply indebted to the 
premodern political vision of ʿulamāʾ like al-Ghazali. However, I do not attribute the 
authoritarian streak in the thought of nineteenth century reformers like al-Tahtawi (and present in 
Jumʿa’s arguments) to this premodern influence. Rather I emphasize of the proto-nationalist 
twist that al-Tahtawi added to the Islamic political imaginary and the appearance of the modern 
nation-state.    
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Jumʿa credits al-Tahtawi as being the first to call for the renewal of the Islamic 
jurisprudential tradition (tajdīd al-fiqh) in modern times, and he clearly sees himself as part of a 
chain of modernist reformers that began with al-Tahtawi.14 Therefore, I will use the writings of 
al-Tahtawi to argue that Jumʿa’s authoritarian sympathies represent the other side of a nineteenth 
century proto-nationalist coin, as it were, rather than a different sub-tradition altogether.15 
Though al-Tahtawi is often credited as the “father of Egyptian democracy,”16 I read his work as 
representing the first link in a chain of Egyptian nationalist ʿulamāʾ with authoritarian 
sympathies, of which Jumʿa is also a part. While drawing attention to the tension between al-
Tahtawi’s democratic and authoritarian sympathies is not new in itself, I argue that this tension 
does not come as a result of his “difficulty in reconciling the workings of the secular political 
system with his basic Islamic outlook”17 or his “late-Ottoman mindset,”18 as is commonly 
presumed to be the case. Instead, I contend that his authoritarian sympathies are rooted in the 
discourse of the emerging nation-state. While al-Tahtawi argued that the progress of the 
Egyptian nation necessitated the cultivation of an engaged citizenry within a new body politic, 
his concept of nationhood was very supportive of the absolutism of Muhammad Ali (d.1849) and 
his successors. Fadel notes that the concept of nationhood makes conceivable the transfer of 
sovereignty from a ruler to a citizenry. However, appeals to national progress also make possible 
all kinds of horrors including, I suggest, the liquidation of recalcitrant citizens at Rabiʿa al-
ʿAdawiyya. 
Significantly, I contend that when Jumʿa uses concepts like taghallub and khawārij, he is 
not speaking to Muslim subjects who see themselves as part of cosmic-moral order sustained by 
God, as was the case in the ideal political order of the premodern ʿulamāʾ. In this article I do not 
wish to overemphasize the extent of the transformations wrought by the appearance of the 
6 
 
nation-state in the Arab World, and establish an absolute dichotomy between the pre and post 
nineteenth century worldviews of the ʿulamāʾ.19 Nevertheless, I do consider the emergence of 
nationhood as a concept to have fundamentally altered the ʿulamāʾ’s conceptual universe. 
Among the most significant changes for the purpose of my argument relates to time. During the 
nineteenth century the premodern order, which had existed temporally in a perpetual present 
underpinned by cosmic justice, was supplanted by a worldview that prioritised the future, or the 
futurity, of the nation.20 This emphasis on the future at the expense of the present excuses 
inhuman behavior in the present as necessary to bring about a better world. My argument, then, 
attenuates the notion of there being shared assumptions underpinning the ideal political orders of 
modern ʿulamāʾ like Jumʿa and their premodern counterparts like al-Ghazali. This is because the 
worldview of Jumʿa and his audience is underpinned by their shared concern for the future of the 
Egyptian nation, and Jumʿa’s arguments for the necessity of the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya massacre 
are justified for the sake of the nation. Similarly, I consider that the accusation of kharijism, 
which Jumʿa directs at the anti-coup protesters is better understood as an accusation of treason 
and expulsion from the Egyptian nation rather than takfīr, or veritable excommunication from the 
Muslim community.21  
This article is divided into five parts. In the first part I analyze al-Tahtawi’s concept of 
nationhood. I highlight al-Tahtawi’s authoritarian sympathies and argue that these sympathies 
are rooted in the emergence of the nation-state. I consider Jumʿa to be part of a chain of 
nationalist Egyptian ʿulamāʾ that began with al-Tahtawi, and in part two I give a biographical 
introduction to Jumʿa. In part three I analyze Jumʿa’s Islamic legal arguments in the wake of the 
coup, focusing on his usage of the concepts taghallub and khawārij. In part four I then argue for 
the importance of understanding Jumʿa’s arguments as part of a discourse of the nation-state and 
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emanating from the state bureaucracy. In the fifth, final part I suggest that Jumʿa’s arguments in 
favor of greater state regulation of Egyptian religious life can be understood as part of a modern 
process rooted in what Hussein Agrama calls the state’s “questioning power” before concluding.   
 
The Father of Egyptian Nationalism: Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi 
In this section I will argue that, while Fadel credits al-Tahtawi with sowing the seeds of a 
republican sub-tradition, al-Tahtawi’s proto-nationalist political theory is just as relevant, if not 
more so, for providing a historical context for Jumʿa’s support of al-Sisi. As Fadel points out, al-
Tahtawi articulates a political order that views the citizen as an active political subject, and it is 
in this shift that Fadel sees the roots of an Islamic republican sub-tradition, in contrast to his sub-
tradition of traditionalist Islam that continued to look to al-Ghazali and other premodern ʿulamāʾ 
for political inspiration. By contrast, in this section I will highlight that al-Tahtawi is also 
thoroughly indebted to the premodern tradition, but not in such a way as it would explain his 
authoritarian leanings. Rather, his authoritarian sympathies come from his proto-nationalism, 
particularly his concern for the future of the nation.  
 Al-Tahtawi’s biography is well known. He came from an elite family in Upper Egypt and 
enrolled at al-Azhar in 1817, becoming a teacher of the Islamic sciences there in 1822. The most 
significant event in al-Tahtawi’s intellectual development came when he accompanied a 
contingent of Egyptian military officers to study in Paris in 1826. Al-Tahtawi spent four years 
studying in Paris and immersed himself in the work of Enlightenment authors like Rousseau and 
Montesquieu.22  On his return to Egypt, al-Tahtawi published a manuscript describing his 
experiences, and throughout his life was a prolific author and translator. Significantly, he also 
played a key role in the development of the Egyptian nation-state.23  
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Al-Tahtawi’s political imaginary was certainly informed by his reading of French 
Enlightenment authors. At the same time, his political vision was deeply indebted to al-Ghazali 
and other premodern ʿulamāʾ. As such, I suggest Jumʿa’s references to an idealized political 
order, while reminiscent of the premodern ʿulamāʾ, does not place him outside the nationalism 
instigated by al-Tahtawi, since the nationalist chain of thought begun by al-Tahtawi also builds 
upon the political vision of the premodern ʿulamāʾ. However, that does not mean that I attribute 
Tahtawi’s authoritarian sympathies to his “late Ottoman mindset” or his “basic Islamic outlook” 
as two historians have put it.24 Instead, I suggest it is the proto-nationalist twist that Tahtawi 
added to the Islamic political vision that provides a historical context for Jumʿa’s support of the 
coup. In short, this nationalist addition was that the citizen serves the nation, the nation 
legitimizes the state, and the progress of the nation is a moral good in itself.  
I make this contention not only because al-Tahtawi’s proto-nationalist writings contain 
authoritarian sympathies, but also because al-Tahtawi is writing at a time when the Egyptian 
nation is just emerging as a discourse. Most importantly here, the concept of nationhood and the 
concern for its wellbeing became intertwined with a temporal transformation. To al-Tahtawi and 
his contemporaries, the idea of civilization (tamaddun) no longer conveyed a cyclical notion of 
time in which civilizations rose and fell. Instead, civilization became a verb that described a 
process, and signalled a faith in the forward drive of progress (taqaddum) through time toward a 
future of open possibilities.25 As such, al-Tahtawi’s writings are dependent upon a worldview 
that considers the future of the nation to be the central concern. For al-Tahtawi, to be an 
Egyptian and a patriot (ḥubb al-waṭan) was not simply to have a national identity, but to share in 
a vision of Egypt’s future civilization.26  
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I argue that it is the inauguration of this new context that positions al-Tahtawi as the first 
link of a chain connecting him to Jumʿa’s arguments in favor of authoritarianism, since they both 
justify their arguments out of a concern for the future of the Egyptian nation and on behalf of the 
national will. The connection between nationalism as a discourse and the nation-state is an 
important part of my argument. Though states are, of course, not solely discursive constructs, 
states produce nations through discourse to legitimate their existence and their power over their 
citizens. As a result of this discourse, citizens recognize themselves in the nation-state and 
become willing to sacrifice their lives for it.27 Significantly, this discourse of the nation, upon 
which the state depends, provides an entirely new context within which authors produce their 
arguments. As such, though “patriotic speeches, ethno-‘national’ literature, public festivals and 
much else” may well have existed prior to the appearance of the nation-state, these kinds of 
writings now acquire new meanings and produce different effects.28 This contextual difference is 
due to the fact that citizens of a nation-state no longer exist within a cosmic-moral order 
underpinned by a just God, but are instead integrated into the “metaphysics of the state and its 
nation.”29 This point is important because, in addition to al-Tahtawi’s proto-nationalist additions 
to the Islamic political imaginary, the very fact that al-Tahtawi’s vision is articulated within the 
novel context of the nation-state endows his arguments with new meanings and effects. This is 
despite the fact that al-Tahtawi’s political vision is also reminiscent of the harmonious political 
order articulated by al-Ghazali and other premodern ʿulamāʾ.  
Al-Tahtawi derived his concept of nation, which he translated as umma or occasionally 
milla, from Montesquieu. Montesquieu wrote that nations have a spirit, customs, and manners.30 
Moreover, Montesquieu’s nation could deliberate, it had a voice, and could choose its leaders. 
For Montesquieu, then, this personified nation had a collective will, and was sovereign. 
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Moreover, this nation was connected to a specific territory, its homeland or patrie, which al-
Tahtawi expressed through the word waṭan. The homeland was a passive concept, it needed to be 
loved and saved by its citizens, who must be willing to die for it. As McLarney has pointed out, 
however, it is common for historians to overemphasize the purely French roots of al-Tahtawi’s 
conceptual innovations,31 and attribute what they perceive as failings in his political vision to his 
al-Azhar training. Al-Tahtawi’s political vision was grounded in the Islamic ethical tradition of 
adab and took as his point of departure the harmonious system articulated by his predecessors.32 
However, al-Tahtawi made a proto-nationalist addition that placed the progress of the nation at 
the center of his vision. As such, rather than attribute al-Tahtawi’s authoritarian leanings to his 
“basic Islamic outlook,”33 I consider al-Tahtawi’s authoritarian sympathies to be a result of his 
place in the emerging discourse of the Egyptian nation-state.34  
In al-Tahtawi’s theoretical writings on obedience to the ruler, he emerges as a nationalist 
and a monarchist with absolutist leanings. There would be chaos without kings, al-Tahtawi 
writes. While al-Tahtawi thought government should be divided into executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, he also argued that all these branches existed under the singular authority of 
the monarch. As such, there was to be no institutional or constitutional restriction on the ruler’s 
power.35 Moreover, al-Tahtawi did not consider the nation to be sovereign, nor did he utilize 
Qurʾanic or Sunnaic sources to advocate for a constitutional check on the ruler’s power, in 
contrast to later authors like ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d.1902) or Muhammad ʿAbduh 
(d.1905).36  
For al-Tahtawi, the ruler’s power was limited only inasmuch as he chooses to exercise 
responsibility and paternalistic concern. The ruler’s subjects owe him their “complete 
obedience,” (al-ṭāʿa al-kāmila) in a manner analogous to the obedience owed to God and the 
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Prophet.37 Additionally, al-Tahtawi writes, “if he [the ruler] oppresses them, then they [the 
people] are to persevere until God opens a door to guide him toward the good.” As such, the 
people have no right to rebel against an unjust ruler, and it is only the mercy of God that can 
“guide [the ruler’s] state toward justice.”38 At first, then, al-Tahtawi’s position on obedience to 
an unjust ruler might resemble the writings of a premodern author, and in this vein Delanoue 
describes al-Tahtawi’s argument as being constructed in a “very traditional manner.”39 However, 
even though al-Tahtawi imagines the relationship between the ruler and the ruled through a vivid 
originally premodern allegory, as a harmonious body in which every organ knows its place and 
function, he exhibits markedly different assumptions about rulership. For example, when he 
writes, “The king is like the soul and [his] subjects are like the body. The body has no strength 
other than through its soul,”40 this does not imply that he understands the ruler-ruled relationship 
in premodern terms of a theorist like al-Mawardi (d.1058) who considered the ruler to play a 
fiduciary role on behalf of the Muslim community.41 In contrast to al-Mawardi, al-Tahtawi 
considers the ruler’s power and status as walī al-amr to come from his status as leader of his 
nation (raʾīs ummatihi).42 To be sure, the corporal metaphor al-Tahtawi uses to describe the 
ruler-ruled relationship is indebted to the premodern order articulated by the premodern ʿulamāʾ. 
In Arabic it originates with al-Farabi’s (d.950) virtuous city, al-madīna al-faḍīla, which in turn 
originates with the Greek polis.43 At the same time, the corporeal metaphor of the national body 
is common to the nationalism that al-Tahtawi encountered in France, while the cité of French 
nationalism also ultimately traces its roots back to the Greek polis and the Roman patria.44 
Clearly then, the political traditions that al-Tahtawi took as his point of departure were by no 
means hermetically sealed, or mutually exclusive. Of course, the same point is relevant for later 
nationalist ʿulamāʾ like Jumʿa.   
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Al-Tahtawi grounds his authoritarian leanings in proto-nationalism, rather than 
premodern lines of reasoning about the ideal political order. In fact, al-Tahtawi himself 
highlights that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled that he is proposing to be new. For 
example, in a passage from Manāhij al-Albāb al-Miṣriyya fī Mabāhij al-Ābāb al-ʿAṣriyya 
(Methods for Hearts and Minds in the Pleasures of Modern Literatures, 1869) he acknowledges 
that in the majority of countries kings were formerly chosen by the authoritative consensus of the 
community (ijmāʿ al-umma) and elected by the masses (intikhābiyyan bi-l-sawād al-ʿaẓam). 
Now however, because elections are the cause of “corruption, civil strife, war and disagreement” 
monarchies have become hereditary in order to ensure the “perfection of the monarchical 
system.”45 In my reading of this passage, I see al-Tahtawi engaging with premodern political 
imaginary in two ways. On the one hand, he is departing from al-Mawardi’s understanding of the 
premodern ruler’s role as fiduciary, because the king is no longer chosen by the authoritative 
consensus of the community. On the other hand, al-Tahtawi is also echoing premodern 
reservations regarding Hellenistic democracy (al-madīna al-jamāʿiyyah) voiced by ʿulamāʾ like 
al-Farabi.46 At the same, al-Tahtawi is thoroughly rooted in his own context. He had been in 
France during a time when a nationalistic cult had been developing around the memory of 
Napoleon Bonaparte, who had become revered as the “martyr and messiah” of the French 
Revolution and was an “emblem of national unity.” Al-Tahtawi was influenced by this cult of 
veneration, and constructed a similar “Napoleon-like myth” around Muhammad Ali.47 As such, 
in my view al-Tahtawi is better understood as a proto-nationalist and a monarchist with 
absolutist leanings who drew from a plethora of traditions rather than an instigator of a 
republican sub-tradition.   
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A concern for the nation’s future, rather than the past, is a quintessential aspect of the 
modern nation-state project. Time is understood as progress, and nations are to be judged against 
one another by their progress.48 Al-Tahtawi expressed this notion through his concept of 
tamaddun, referring to the material and moral civilizing of the Egyptian nation that was to be 
carried out by all its citizens.49 As such, one of the few checks on the ruler’s power that al-
Tahtawi does emphasize is public opinion (al-raʾy al-ʿumūmī). This check was significant in al-
Tahtawi’s view, to the extent that he referred to public opinion as a “vanquishing sultan” (sulṭān 
qāhir) in the heart of the king.50 However, in my view this check was subordinate to proto-
nationalist concerns, because while al-Tahtawi wrote a “free nation” should be consulted by the 
ruler, the benefit of this consultation was to be that subjects could help the ruler “please their 
waṭan” and ensure his “moral domination of the souls and lives of his subjects” (al-tasalṭun al-
maʿnawī ʿalā al-nufūs wa-l-arwāḥ).51 More significantly for my arguments here is that, in the 
paragraph following after al-Tahtawi’s description of public opinion as a vanquishing sultan, he 
then emphasizes the importance of a particular segment of the public: the historian. Al-Tahtawi 
emphasizes the importance of the ruler’s concern for history and the historian as a particularly 
important check on his power. Presumably, the ruler is concerned for how history and the 
historians of the future will judge him on how best he had served the nation and aided its 
progress.52 
In this section I have emphasized that al-Tahtawi’s Islamic legal writings contained 
authoritarian sympathies. This point is not new in itself.53 However, while other scholars 
attribute these sympathies to al-Tahtawi’s inability to reconcile his reading of French 
Enlightenment thought with his study at al-Azhar, I have argued that his authoritarian leanings 
are predicated on proto-nationalism. This nationalism is a product of modern nation-state 
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discourse that emerged as a result of the Enlightenment.54 As such, while al-Tahtawi is indebted 
to the harmonious political order variously articulated by al-Farabi, al-Mawardi, al-Ghazali and 
many others, those figures understood themselves as a part of a cosmic-moral order that was 
stable, unchanging, and underpinned by a just God. By contrast, al-Tahtawi’s worldview is 
underpinned by a concern for the good of the nation and the nation’s future.   
Fadel suggested that Jumʿa and other advocates of traditionalist Islam had shared 
understandings of an ideal political order with their premodern counterparts, and this was a key 
factor in determining their support for the coup. This shared ideal was dominated by the view 
that only when the religious and military elites supported each other under a system regulated by 
a pious autocrat could the public order be maintained.55 By contrast, Fadel suggested that 
opponents of the coup like al-Qaradawi drew their inspiration from nineteenth century reformers 
like al-Tahtawi, who instigated a republican sub-tradition. In constructing my alternative 
interpretation, I have contended that al-Tahtawi’s own vision was also very much indebted to the 
premodern political imaginary, and that he began a chain of thought that was proto-nationalist 
with authoritarian leanings and this is significant for understanding Jumʿa’s support for the coup. 
At the same time, I consider al-Tahtawi’s authoritarian sympathies to be more thoroughly rooted 
in modern nationalism and in the discourse of the state, which produces a nation to legitimate 
itself, rather than Islamic premodern thought. I will now show that it is the quintessentially 
modern political assumptions about progress and the good of the nation that Jumʿa shares with 
al-Tahtawi, which is at the root of Jumʿa’s own authoritarian sympathies and support for the 
coup.  
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ʿAli Jumʿa’s Image before the Coup: Liberal, Democratic, Progressive 
For the remainder of this article I will focus on Jumʿa’s Islamic legal arguments justifying the 
coup and its bloody aftermath. The diverse anti-Brotherhood coalition that coalesced against the 
Mursi-led government in 2013 included liberal elites, Salafists, and army officers, but was bound 
together by nationalism.56 Jumʿa and many of the Azharite ʿulamāʾ were also part of this 
coalition, and their decision to join it is indebted in no small part to the Egyptian nationalist 
chain that al-Tahtawi instigated. This is because, like al-Tahtawi and the nationalist ʿulamāʾ who 
came after him, Jumʿa’s arguments can also be understood as part of a nation-state discourse, 
and Jumʿa justifies his position through the modern concern for the future of the nation.   
Jumʿa is somewhat unusual among the ʿulamāʾ of al-Azhar in that he began his education 
in a secular institution. He earned his BA in Commerce from Ain Shams University in 1973. He 
then enrolled at al-Azhar and received a BA in Islamic studies in 1979, before completing an 
MA and PhD in Islamic jurisprudence. He then joined al-Azhar’s teaching faculty in 1988. Jumʿa 
developed a reputation as a gifted scholar and, by combining an engaging preaching style with 
mild criticisms of the Mubarak regime, amassed a wide following among Egypt’s pious middle 
class.57 During the 1990s Jumʿa was also the Director of the International Institute of Islamic 
Thought’s (IIIT) Cairo office,58 which at that time served as a hub for scholars who could be 
loosely termed “New Islamists” including Abdelwahab al-Mesiri (d.2008), Heba Raouf Ezzat 
(b.1965), Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996), and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926).59 Jumʿa’s position 
at the (IIIT) office in Cairo clearly does not mean that Jumʿa was sympathetic to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, Jumʿa’s own understanding of the kind of legal reform necessary to 
renew the Islamic jurisprudential tradition shares many similarities with the New Islamists who 
lay claim to the legacy of the nineteenth century reformers like Rida and al-Tahtawi. For 
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example, Jumʿa writes sympathetically about Muhammad al-Ghazali and al-Qaradawi’s 
controversial efforts in the realm of hadith criticism,60 and both Jumʿa and al-Qaradawi were 
signatories of the Amman Message in 2006.61 This similarity in perspective renders Jumʿa and 
al-Qaradawi’s later public disagreement over the 2013 coup all the more surprising.       
It was with Jumʿa’s appointment to the office of Grand Mufti in 2003 that his popularity 
became international. He wrote regular op-eds for The Washington Post and articulated 
progressive positions on issues like democracy,62 FGM, and female political participation.63 
Jumʿa never become quite as well-known as, say, ʿAmr Khalid (b.1967)64 or al-Qaradawi, and he 
built his support on different bases. Rather than cultivating an image as a relatable everyman 
(like Khalid) or a scholar-activist (like al-Qaradawi), Jumʿa instead worked to cultivate a Sufi 
mystique through a teaching style that made “centuries-old texts exciting and timely, tying them 
to the burning issues of the moment.” In Jumʿa’s study-circles he would encourage his students, 
both male and female, to engage with the great classical texts of the Islamic tradition saying, 
“You must stand where they stood and think and reflect.”65 On the basis of his progressiveness 
on key issues, democratic sympathies and mystical leanings, Jumʿa also became particularly 
popular with Muslim student-travelers from Europe and North America. These student-travelers 
would come to Cairo in search of an authentic scholarly tradition that Jumʿa’s mystique appeared 
to represent to them.66  
Jumʿa’s arguments in favor of the coup and the clearing of the protest camps were never 
published in a single location.67 Rather, he presented his justifications through interviews, 
lectures and speeches via the media. The most significant sources are an interview broadcast on 
CBC Egypt on 23 August 2013 and a lecture to the army that appears to have been recorded 
during Ramadan 2013 (between 9 July and 7 August 2013).68 As such, it was likely produced 
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before the massacre at Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya on 14 August 2013. The lecture also appears to have 
been intended specifically for distribution among the army, given that among the topics Jumʿa 
discusses is the issue of desertion and militancy in the Sinai region. By focusing on these sources 
it becomes possible to ascertain Jumʿa’s Islamic legal justifications for the coup and the 
aftermath.  
 
The Concepts of Taghallub and Khawārij in Jumʿa’s Argument  
In the CBC interview on 23 August 2013 (after the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya massacre) Jumʿa refers 
to the concept of taghallub as justification for the coup.69 In premodern fiqh, taghallub was used 
by some ʿulamāʾ to rationalize their acquiescence to a ruler seizing power by force. The 
justification for this seizure was that to rule effectively and ensure stability a ruler must have the 
allegiance of the military, otherwise there would be chaos. As such, it was considered better to 
lend legitimacy to a usurper who was able to seize power quickly and successfully, rather than 
support a ruler who had just been deposed. A deposed ruler clearly did not enjoy the support of 
the military and so, as the ʿulamāʾ’s reasoning went, continuing to support him would only lead 
to a protracted civil war. As such, the majority of the ʿulamāʾ felt it was better to focus their 
energies on influencing how the usurper exercised their power once he had seized it, rather than 
concerning themselves with the issue of whether or not that power had been seized 
legitimately.70  
Jumʿa refers to this originally premodern concept of taghallub as he looks to legitimize 
the coup, but in a distinctly novel way. His reference to taghallub is novel because he connects it 
to the modern concept of the Egyptian national will. At first, Jumʿa’s argument looks familiar to 
earlier justifications of seizing power by force when he states that, “If an Iman [i.e. a ruler] who 
had assumed power legitimately is arrested by those under his own authority he loses his 
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legitimacy.”71 For Jumʿa, Mursi was not a ruler with the capacity to rule effectively and ensure 
stability, or else the army would not have been willing or able to arrest him, and this fact means 
that Mursi is no longer a legitimate ruler. Rather than referring to this process as a coup 
(inqilāb), Jumʿa refers to the arrest of Mursi as a legitimate assuming of power due to greater 
strength and capacity to govern possessed by Mursi’s opponents.72 So far, this reasoning 
resembles the rationale of some of Jumʿa’s premodern predecessors. However, Jumʿa then 
connects his understanding of taghallub to the concept of the national will, a notion that 
originates in Islamic political thought with the proto-nationalism of al-Tahtawi. When Jumʿa 
says “We have become the ones with legitimacy to rule through our capacity to govern 
effectively,” (aṣbaḥnā al-mutaghallibīn) he justifies this seizure of power via the concept of the 
sovereignty of the nation and the national will. Jumʿa begins by explaining, “What happened in 
the revolution of 30 June [referring to the beginning of demonstrations leading up to the coup] is 
that people came out in protest.”73 Referring to the sovereignty (siyāda) of the people, Jumʿa 
then argues that the army then intervened only in response to the undivided voice of “all the 
Egyptian people” (jamīʿan), and that al-Sisi was acting in accordance with the will of the people 
(bināʾan ʿalā al-shaʿb).74 As far as Jumʿa is concerned, it was only the voice of the people that 
initially gave the army permission to intervene in a manner that proceeded according to the terms 
of taghallub.75 In the lecture he produced for the army during Ramadan, Jumʿa claimed that the 
crowds of protesters had numbered thirty million.76 As such, even though Jumʿa referred to the 
concept of taghallub in order to legitimate the coup in a manner that resembled a premodern 
rationale, his reasoning is underpinned by the modern assumption that it was the voice of the 
personified nation that justified Mursi’s ousting.   
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One of the most striking aspects of Jumʿa’s argument in favor of the coup and its 
aftermath was his common referral to the anti-coup demonstrators as khawārij.77 Jumʿa often 
referred to a hadith that called the khawārij the “the dogs of hell” (kilāb al-nār). He also referred 
to another hadith, commonly understood as referring to the khawārij, that reads, “He who comes 
to you when you are united and wants to divide you, kill him.” 78 The term khawārij has a long 
history in Islamic thought, dating back to the time of ʿAli, the fourth Caliph.79 At first, Jumʿa’s 
statements would appear to invoking this history, and could therefore be construed as a veritable 
excommunication of the Brotherhood and their supporters from the Muslim community, thereby 
legitimating their deaths. Understanding contemporary accusations of kharijism by the Sunni 
ʿulamāʾ in premodern terms, however, overlooks the extent to which the Egyptian nation-state 
has transformed the concept since the nineteenth century. In this new context, the accusation of 
kharijism refers to treason, terrorism, and is predicated upon the good of the Egyptian nation. As 
Jeffrey T. Kenney has shown, during the twentieth century the contestation over the concept of 
kharijism in Egypt was no longer a question of who is a member of the Muslim community and 
who is not. Rather, what was at stake was membership of the Egyptian nation.80 
 Kenney argues that over the centuries the Sunni ʿulamāʾ establishment has molded the 
shifted the term khawārij away from the original rebels ʿAli and molded the term into an 
ahistorical symbol representing illegitimate rebellion against a legitimate ruler.81 As Kenney puts 
it, 
 
Kharijism has an unequivocal legacy in the Islamic tradition [...] the image of the 
Kharijites is that they never rise up to defend a just cause or to denounce an unjust 
ruler. They always separate themselves from both leaders and fellow Muslims 
who are worthy of respect, and they always kill those who truly deserve better. 
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Most important, despite wearing their faith on their sleeves, they never really 
represent the principles of Islam for which they claim to fight.82  
 
 In postcolonial Egypt, however, the meaning and purpose of the kharijite accusation has 
been altered further by the discourse of the nation-state that aimed to turn the population within 
its territory into compliant citizens. Consequently, “a good Muslim [became] nothing more than 
a good citizen of the state, someone who obeys the law and remains loyal. Kharijite and traitor to 
the modern state [became] the same.”83 As such, membership of the nation is what is at stake for 
those the ʿulamāʾ accuse of kharijism today, rather than membership of the Muslim community. 
It was in this context that the accusation of kharijism re-emerged in postcolonial Egypt, when it 
formed part of a broader attempt to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in 1948 
and 1954. The nationalization of al-Azhar by the Nasserite government then “brought the charge 
of kharijism into the orbit of government policy” and the accusation of kharijism that the ʿulamāʾ 
establishment directed toward the Brotherhood became a part of state propaganda.84  
Jumʿa similarly uses the khawārij accusation to explain why the anti-coup protests were 
happening, and this accusation is also part of a more recent history of contestation between the 
Brotherhood and the ʿulamāʾ establishment. Jumʿa’s predecessors in the al-Azhar establishment 
often accused the Brotherhood of kharijism. Like Jumʿa, they also littered their arguments with 
the same hadith that referred to the khawārij (i.e. the Brotherhood) as the “dogs of hell.” My 
point is that the postcolonial history of the ʿulamāʾ establishment’s usage of the kharijite 
accusation against the Brotherhood is not a question of sin and unbelief, but stems from the 
nation-state’s concerns to prevent disorder while also delegitimizing the Brotherhood as a voice 
of Islam.85 The accusation of kharijism has come to play the same role as accusations of 
terrorism do for the United States and,86 as Richard Falk notes, 
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The resonance of the word terrorist [and here I would add, kharijite,] makes it an 
often valuable tool in political conflict. If the tactics and organizational entity of 
rival political forces can be described as terrorist and that label can be made to 
stick, two consequences follow: no pressure for concessions on political 
grievances and acceptability of the use of ruthless means and suspension of 
normal constitutional limits to inflict pain and death.87 
 
Jumʿa, then, is following these modern iterations of the accusation of kharijism, using it to mean 
an accusation of terrorism. He is affirming the nation-state’s legitimacy to use force, while also 
attempting to re-establish the Azharite ʿulamāʾ’s monopoly on speaking in the name of Islam.  
 
Jumʿa’s Arguments as Part of the Nation-State Discourse: The Necessity of Quiet Death 
Jumʿa’s description of the anti-coup protesters as khawārij is not an accusation of unbelief, 
putting the anti-coup protesters outside the bounds of the Muslim community. Rather, this 
accusation is better understood as an accusation of betraying the nation. I consider putting a 
group outside the bounds of the premodern Muslim community to markedly different to putting a 
group outside the bounds of the modern nation-state. This is because, while the premodern 
community considered itself to be bound by morals laws outside its control and part of a moral 
cosmology sustained by God and the Sharia, the nation-state controls and promulgates the law to 
serve its own advancement.88 Foucault uses the concept of bio-power to describe the difference 
between the power the premodern sovereign had over his subjects and the power the state has 
over its citizens. While a premodern sovereign had complete power over the deaths of his 
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subjects, the nation-state controls the life of the nation and its citizens. Subsequently, modern 
wars and massacres are not undertaken to cause death, but rather to preserve the life of the 
nation.89 When massacres are justified in the name of preserving the nation, they become far 
more frequent. I consider Jumʿa’s arguments legitimating the army’s killing of the protesters at 
Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya to be rooted in this same assumption.   
In his lecture to the army, Jumʿa emphasizes that the anti-coup protesters “do not love the 
homeland” and, as a result, “do not deserve our Egyptianess” (lā yastaḥiqqūnā miṣriyyatanā). To 
Jumʿa, they are traitors who have no claim to membership of the Egyptian nation. Jumʿa also 
describes the situation as one of increasing anarchy in the country and, as a result, the protesters’ 
deaths have become necessary to preserve the nation. However, in line with Foucault’s 
argument, though Jumʿa encourages the army to “respond with full force against those who do 
not love this waṭan” he does not describe the army as an agent of destruction, but rather as a 
preserver of life. In contrast to the protestors, who do not want “Egypt to rise,” Jumʿa praises the 
army as a developer of the waṭan by, for example, building roads and as a protector of the 
nation.90 Similarly, while the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya massacre was widely reported in the media, it 
was not perpetrated as a public spectacle. Rather, bulldozers were immediately on hand to clear 
the wreckage away the bodies of the deceased were quietly removed, and only released to their 
relatives much later, if at all. Foucault describes these kinds of massacres as an intrinsic 
manifestation of bio-power, “That death is so carefully evaded is linked less to a new anxiety 
which makes death unbearable for our societies than to the fact that the procedures of power” 
have changed.91 Perpetrating mass death quietly in the name of preserving life is central to state 
power. By making the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya massacre appear necessary to protect the nation 
Jumʿa played an important role in this process. 
23 
 
When Jumʿa spoke to the army he argued that the anti-coup protesters were a threat to the 
nation, even though they were unarmed. Instead, he claimed that the threat the protesters posed 
was through their words. Jumʿa suggested that the protesters, just like the khawārij in his view, 
were “using words they do not believe in,” like legitimacy (sharʿiyya) and democracy. As such, 
Jumʿa accused the protesters of incitement (taḥrīḍ), and “this incitement is, in its essence, 
incitement to civil strife (fitna).” Moreover, incitement is “like the strike of a sword” and “words 
are like weapons.” Jumʿa said that those who incite, that is the protesters, were killing people 
figuratively (maʿnawiyyan), and God will judge them as though they have killed human beings. 
To explain what he meant, Jumʿa used the example of a protest on 8 July 2013 outside the 
military barracks where Mursi was being held. Jumʿa said that this protest caused terror among 
the people, “women are scared and miscarry, and their hair goes white with fear.” Moreover, 
these protests destroyed property, closed roads, and obstructed prayer. They spread false rumors, 
“which in our modern language we call terrorism.”92 That day, fifty-one people were killed 
outside the barracks as the army fired into the crowd “like pouring rain” as one witness put it.93 
However, Jumʿa explained in his lecture to the army that this response, firing into a crowd, was 
self-defense. “When I am attacked,” Jumʿa said, “I am not just defending myself, but defending 
life and security.” The army had no choice “but to kill those who spread lies” and those people 
“have to be killed to save others.” The army was noble in character and soldiers killed as a last 
resort, because “when the enemy is strong, you have no option but to shoot him from a distance.” 
Jumʿa even went so far as to suggest that the protestors were “committing suicide” because, “If I 
play with a gun,” Jumʿa said, meaning that if the protesters incited the army through their 
presence in the streets, “it is my fault if it kills me.”94  
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 I consider Jumʿa’s argument that the army’s killing of unarmed protesters was necessary 
to defend the nation to be rooted in a bureaucratic logic that facilitates impersonal mass killings. 
Even though the protesters were not armed, they were a threat to the social order. As scholars 
such as Zygmunt Bauman have argued, in times of social dislocation the impersonal nature of 
state bureaucratic logic leads bureaucracies to conclude that massacres are a necessity for the 
good of the nation.95 Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, al-Azhar was 
integrated into the bureaucracy of the Egyptian nation-state and,96 though by August 2013 Jumʿa 
was no longer officially Grand Mufti he was nevertheless still part of Egypt’s bureaucratic 
discourse.  
 
The State and the Mixing of Religion and Politics 
At first glance, Jumʿa’s legitimation of the coup would seem to a prime example of a religious 
scholar’s intervention in politics. However, the notion that religion and politics are two distinct 
realms is not self-evidently true, but rather is the result of a historical process that began in 
seventeenth century Europe and then spread unevenly throughout the world during the colonial 
and postcolonial periods.97 The modern ʿulamāʾ have, of course, been affected by this process. 
As such, while they may disagree with the ideological notion that religion and politics are not to 
be mixed, they have nevertheless accepted that the concepts of religion and politics are distinct 
and refer to different phenomena. With that point in mind, Hussein Agrama has argued that the 
discourse of modern states is characterized by states’ ever-increasing capacity to regulate 
religious life.98 I will now argue that Jumʿa’s interventions in 2013 are part of this process of 
expansion.  
In his own reading of Jumʿa’s arguments Fadel wrote that, in supporting the coup, 
“Traditionalist theologians such as [Jumʿa] have clearly decided that protection of religious 
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orthodoxy is more important than establishing a representative government. In making this 
choice, they are clearly vindicating a well-established line of reasoning in Islamic political 
thought.”99 Fadel’s argument was that the Azharite ʿulamāʾ were unable to tolerate the markedly 
increased diversity of competing voices in the post-2011 Islamic public sphere, and saw in al-
Sisi “a religious autocrat who can control religious debate.”100 While I do not disagree with this 
interpretation, I contend that a fruitful additional means to make sense of Jumʿa’s reasoning is 
through Agrama’s arguments on secularism and Egyptian state discourse.     
 In Questioning Secularism Agrama explains how the nation-state purports to regulate the 
divide between religion and politics. Taking up the question, “is Egypt a Secular or Islamic 
state?” Agrama argues instead that such a question is neither useful nor even answerable. Rather, 
Agrama suggests that the very fact one cannot say definitively whether Egypt is a secular state or 
not is the essence of secular power.101 Agrama argues that secular power is not the power of the 
state to establish norms, rules and boundaries that divide religion and politics. Instead, secular 
power is a “questioning power” that works by continually raising questions and causing anxieties 
among the population about where the divide between religion and politics really lies. For the 
public the answer to this anxiety is that further intervention by the state is necessary and 
legitimate, so that this unclear divide can be resolved satisfactorily. It is in this mistaken 
assumption, however, that the root of secular power lies. This is because it is the state itself that 
first produces the concepts of religion and politics as separate entities that can, and should, be 
divided. However, secular power does not divide these realms at all but rather, “hopelessly blurs 
them.” As a result, the public assume that the state simply needs more power to resolve the 
religious-political divide, and subsequently accept the expansion of the state’s sovereign capacity 
over more realms of social life. It is this circular premise, that the state is needed to reconcile a 
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divide between two realms it created, and blurs between, then, that is at the root of secular 
power, and leads to the ever-increasing expansion of state sovereign capacity in social life.102 As 
such, I argue that in addition to understanding Jumʿa’s support for the military as part of a desire 
to restrict new voices entering the Islamic public sphere, his intervention is also part of the 
dynamic Agrama has described. Jumʿa’s arguments help create the anxiety that the Brotherhood 
and their supporters are mixing religion and politics because, like the khawārij in Jumʿa’s view, 
they “utter words of truth intending falsehood.”103 At the same time, Jumʿa is also a religious 
scholar and former Grand Mufti, who is now speaking to the public as a private citizen, further 
compounding the discursive mingling of religion and politics. In line with Agrama’s argument, 
the solution that Jumʿa proposes is greater state control to police the religion-politics divide. For 
example, in a number of interviews with the Egyptian press Jumʿa argues that the state must be 
given the capacity to regulate religious life further by granting licenses to issue fatwas, and have 
more control of mosques and sermons. 
 For example, in an interview with the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram in February 2013, 
just before Jumʿa left office, the interviewer asks Jumʿa to describe the greatest challenges facing 
his successor, Shawki ʿAllam (b.1961). In his response, Jumʿa expresses his concern about the 
current “chaos in religious discourse” (fawḍa fi-l-khiṭāb al-dīnī), as he calls it.104 Jumʿa explains 
that the Egyptian public sphere is awash with an overwhelming diversity of religious opinions 
ranging from the extreme, to the licentious, to the moderate, the political and so on. The problem 
is that the Egyptian public do not know whom to trust. Furthermore, the people who issue these 
fatwas are only “expressing their personal views, not [the views of] the religious 
establishment.”105 Fadel considers Jumʿa’s concerns in this interview to be reminiscent of a 
yearning for the political order idealized by the premodern ʿulamāʾ. Al-Ghazali considered the 
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ideal social order to be strictly hierarchical, with the ʿulamāʾ and the ruling establishment at the 
top speaking with one voice on matters of religion and governance while the public listened 
obediently. As a result, Fadel argues that Jumʿa’s desire to support the coup is rooted first and 
foremost in the historically well-established view that public order can only be preserved when 
there is a single, authoritative voice speaking on behalf of Islam. Fadel emphasizes that, for 
Jumʿa, tolerating a pluralistic Islamic public sphere means tolerating chaos and is 
unacceptable.106 
 In contrast to Fadel’s argument, I suggest first of all that Jumʿa’s concerns about an 
overly pluralistic public sphere are better contextualized in historical terms by the nationalism 
that began with al-Tahtawi, rather than the ideal political order of al-Ghazali.107 Second of all, I 
consider Jumʿa’s arguments in favor of greater state regulation of religion to be part of the 
broader discursive process whereby citizens accept that greater state control is necessary as a 
result of the state’s questioning power. While al-Tahtawi did display a certain tolerance for a 
diversity of publicly expressed opinions and ideas, he always added that this tolerance was not to 
be at the expense of “national unity.” Moreover, al-Tahtawi also emphasized that internal 
disorder (al-ikhtilāl al-dākhilī) and civil strife (fitan) were to be avoided to ensure that the nation 
(umma) would remain strong enough to defend the waṭan.108 Al-Tahtawi initiated these tropes, 
which were mobilized by later nationalist authoritarians like Nasser,109 and they play a key role 
in Jumʿa’s arguments as well. Jumʿa’s refers to the Egyptian public as the “children of the 
homeland” (abnāʾ al-waṭan). Like al-Tahtawi, Jumʿa describes his own role as a servant of the 
waṭan. Speaking to al-Ahram in 2013 about his impending departure from his post, Jumʿa says “I 
am going to continue to serve my religion, my homeland, and my brothers […] I ask almighty 
God that He help the new [Grand] Mufti to complete the journey of making the Dar al-Ifta an 
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example that all state institutions will follow, in order to revive this beloved waṭan, and return 
Egypt to its former era of preeminence, advancement and progress.”110 I also consider Jumʿa’s 
understanding of freedom to have its origins in al-Tahtawi’s proto-nationalism. Jumʿa says, 
“Freedom means adhering to [proper] authority and legitimacy, not escaping [from them] and 
following capricious whims or desires.”111 Al-Tahtawi and the ʿulamāʾ who came after him also 
understood freedom first and foremost as the freedom to obey the law, and the freedom to love 
the waṭan.112 Like al-Tahtawi, underpinning Jumʿa’s arguments is his concern for the future of 
the Egyptian nation and its progress.    
 Jumʿa’s solution to the perceived problem of chaos in religious discourse is increased 
state control over religious life, and he is therefore an important actor facilitating the state’s 
increasing capacities of control. Jumʿa advocates for a law granting the Dar al-Ifta the exclusive 
right to issue licenses to regulate the promulgation of fatwas.113 He makes his arguments in 
unison with the Egyptian Minister of Awqaf, which at the time was also attempting to assert 
control of all Egypt’s mosques. The Ministry made this attempt by stripping thousands of imams 
of their licenses to preach, and attempted to close all small mosques less than 860 square feet in 
size. These moves were justified by Jumʿa and the Ministry because of a need to disentangle 
religion and politics, or counteract the “merchants of religion” (tujjār al-dīn i.e. the Brotherhood) 
as they put it.114 Jumʿa argued that “it is necessary that this matter [of issuing fatwas] should be 
restricted to specialized scholars, and that scholars who wish to assume this role [must] be 
trained thoroughly” and, at the time, the Ministry of Awqaf planned to send Azhari trained 
imams throughout the country.115 As such, on the one hand Jumʿa’s arguments for greater state 
support for al-Azhar and the Dar al-Ifta can certainly be read as part of the ʿulamāʾ’s conscious 
decisions to reassert their power in the public sphere over the Brotherhood and other groups as 
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Fadel points out.116 On the other hand, at the level of state discourse, I also contend that Jumʿa’s 
arguments can be read as an illustration of how the state comes to enjoy a greater capacity to 
regulate religious social life.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article I have analyzed ʿAli Jumʿa’s arguments in favor of the coup and its aftermath 
during the Egyptian 2013 counter-revolution. Alongside Fadel’s own analysis of Jumʿa’s support 
for the coup, I have argued that Jumʿa’s Islamic legal arguments can be fruitfully understood as 
nationalist, and as part of a discourse of the nation-state. As such, rather than comparing Jumʿa’s 
authoritarian sympathies to the hierarchical relationships found between Sufi shaykhs and their 
murīds, or to well-established, premodern lines of reasoning, I have contended that, if one were 
looking to make a historical comparison, Jumʿa’s arguments have their roots in the writings of 
Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi. Al-Tahtawi was the first in a long chain of nationalist ʿulamāʾ leading up to 
Jumʿa and his contemporaries. Like Jumʿa, al-Tahtawi’s writings are part of a discourse that 
produces new subjects, citizens, who are loyal and recognize themselves in the idea of the nation 
and are concerned with that nation’s future. Rather than viewing al-Tahtawi as instigating a new, 
republican sub-tradition that is distinct from a sub-tradition Fadel calls traditionalist Islam, I 
emphasized that al-Tahtawi’s political vision is also very much indebted to the premodern 
political imaginary. At the same time, I have foregrounded al-Tahtawi’s proto-nationalist 
additions to this political vision, and argued that the authoritarian sympathies within his proto-
nationalism is part of chain that leads to Jumʿa.  
A state cannot justify its existence without a nation. The discursive creation of the nation 
by the state pulled the premodern Muslim out of a cosmic-moral order underpinned by God and 
into a new order defined by the nation-state.117 With this point in mind, I demonstrated that 
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Jumʿa’s arguments were rooted in an appeal to progress of the nation, and out of a concern to 
protect it. I also emphasized Jumʿa’s usage of the concept of taghallub. Even though taghallub is 
originally a premodern Islamic legal concept, I showed that Jumʿa’s usage of the concept is 
novel inasmuch as it is connected to the concept of popular sovereignty and the national will, 
which legitimated the army’s intervention. As such, Jumʿa’s arguments represent a new 
phenomenon whereby lines of reasoning, which had their origins in premodern Islamic political 
thought, are being redeployed in the modern context with entirely new justifications, and being 
put to new purposes.  
The aftermath of the coup was dominated by the massacre at Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya. The 
most striking aspect of Jumʿa’s legitimization of the massacre was his referral to the protesters as 
khawārij. While this might appear to be a reiteration of a premodern concept that served to 
excommunicate the anti-coup protesters from the Muslim community and legitimate their killing, 
I argued instead that the term khawārij has a very particular history in postcolonial Egyptian 
politics. Not only is the concept intended to serve as an explanation for a rebellion and convey 
the meaning of illegitimate rebellion against a legitimate ruler, it also carries the meaning of 
terrorism and treason against the nation and has been a common feature of anti-Brotherhood 
diatribes since at least 1948. The accusation of kharijism, then, which Jumʿa levels at the anti-
coup protesters, does not put them outside the Muslim community, but outside the bounds of the 
nation.  
Being put outside a premodern Muslim community is different from expulsion from the 
modern nation in a number of ways. While the premodern sovereign enjoyed total power over 
the deaths over his subjects, the modern state enjoys complete dominance over the life of the 
nation and its citizens. Similarly, the assumptions that Jumʿa drew upon to legitimate the 
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massacres were rooted in the preservation of life, rather than power over death. He argued that 
the protesters had to be killed to save the nation. This rationale was quintessentially modern, and 
does not have its origins in the political order idealized by the premodern ʿulamāʾ. As a number 
of scholars have emphasized, appeals to the future progress of the nation make all kinds of 
horrors possible in the present. 
Finally, in the months prior to the 2013 coup, Jumʿa spoke of his deep concern about the 
multiplicity of voices speaking in the name of Islam in the Egyptian public sphere. He referred to 
this phenomenon as the “chaos of religious discourse.” Fadel argued that this concern was a key 
factor in the Azharite ʿulamāʾ and Jumʿa’s support for the coup, and was drawn from the 
historical vision of a hierarchical society promulgated by premodern ʿulamāʾ like al-Ghazali. By 
contrast, I have emphasized that Jumʿa’s concern was first of all underpinned by his concern for 
the future of the nation, a concern he shares with al-Tahtawi. Second of all, I argued that the 
solution Jumʿa proposed, increased state control, was symptomatic of a discourse that first 
creates two separate concepts of religion and politics, inextricably blurs them together, and then 
validates the state’s existence as the only force able to disentangle them. Agrama termed this 
dynamic the “questioning power” of secularism. 
Academics who study contemporary Islam and politics in the Arab World have primarily 
concerned themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the activist ʿulamāʾ close to that 
movement like al-Qaradawi, who promulgated a “fiqh of revolution” (fiqh al-thawra) in support 
of the 2011 Arab Spring.118 However, since the Egyptian coup in 2013 it is now time to focus on 
the fiqh of counter-revolution advanced by the ʿulamāʾ establishment. This article is an effort to 
contribute to this emerging conversation and, alongside Fadel’s emphasis on the importance of 
history and aspects of contemporary Sufism, I have emphasized that Jumʿa’s fiqh of counter-
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revolution can also be usefully understood as rooted in nationalism and a concern to protect the 
Egyptian nation.  
Author’s note: I wish to express my gratitude to Muhammad Fadel and Carl Sharif El-Tobgui for sharing drafts of 
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